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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 Appellant Neil Oser was sentenced in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for his 
role in two drug conspiracies to which he pled guilty.  He argues 
that the district court erred in ordering that the sentences 
imposed should run consecutively rather than concurrently and/or 
co-terminously with the term of imprisonment which he is serving 
for a currency reporting violation to which he pled guilty in the 
federal court in New York.  He also argues that the district 
court erred in setting his criminal history level. 
 I.  
 On June 19, 1991, United States Customs Agents at JFK 
Airport arrested Neil Oser before he boarded a flight bound for 
Lagos, Nigeria for understating on customs forms the amount of 
United States currency he was transporting.  He had reported that 
he was carrying $65,000 in cash, when in fact he carried a total 
of $790,000.  Oser pled guilty in the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of New York to a charge of failing 
to accurately report the transport of cash abroad in violation of 
31 U.S.C. § 5316.  That plea, a waiver of indictment, and a plea 





pending sentencing on condition and with notice that he would be 
subject to an additional sentence should he commit another 
offense while on pretrial release.  On July 23, 1993, the 
district court in New York rejected Oser’s various requests for a 
downward departure and sentenced him to 28 months in prison. 
 In the interim, Oser was indicted on July 29, 1992, in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and charged with conspiracy 
to import heroin into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 963 and money laundering of $7,200 in postal money orders that 
were drug payments to his brother in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1956(a).  The Pennsylvania indictment included as an overt act 
Oser's June 19, 1991 "attempt[] to smuggle" approximately 
$800,000 cash out of the United States from New York, although 
that paragraph made no reference to drugs or the subsequent 
heroin conspiracy described in the indictment.  The substance of 
the Pennsylvania indictment and all of the remaining overt acts 
refer to transactions pertinent to a conspiracy to import heroin 
through March 1992. 
 On September 3, 1993, Oser was again indicted in the 
District of New Jersey and charged with conspiracy to import 
heroin into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963 and 
possession of heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  The New Jersey indictment alleged that the 
criminal activity charged took place from July 1992 through 
February 1993, a period that included activity after Oser pled 
guilty to the false currency charge in New York.  The government 





indictments involve international heroin smuggling activities, 
they involved different participants and different time periods, 
a contention supported by the facts set forth in the pre-sentence 
report.1 
 Oser pled guilty to the Pennsylvania conspiracy and 
money laundering charges on December 3, 1992.  The New Jersey 
case was transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 
May 1994 in order to consolidate for disposition.  On June 13, 
1994, Oser also pled guilty to the New Jersey conspiracy charge.  
  On January 26, 1995, the district court sentenced Oser 
to a nine year term of imprisonment on the New Jersey charge, 
with an additional one year enhancement pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3147 and U.S.S.G. § 2J1.7 because Oser committed the New Jersey 
offense while on pre-sentence release from the New York 
conviction.  The district court imposed an identical sentence on 
the Pennsylvania conspiracy charge to run concurrently with the 
New Jersey sentence.  On the Pennsylvania money laundering 
charge, the court sentenced Oser to five years, plus an 
additional one-year sentence for commission of the crime while on 
release, also to run concurrently with the other sentences.  
                     
1  According to the pre-sentence report, the Pennsylvania 
conspiracy involved only Neil Oser and his brother, Marty Oser, 
in an agreement made in Philadelphia with several confidential 
informants to import two separate 1 kilogram shipments of heroin 
into the United States.  The New Jersey conspiracy, by contrast, 
involved a much larger and more sophisticated network of couriers 
as well as co-conspirators, responsible for importing multi-
kilogram shipments of heroine.  The drug network, which may have 
been organized by Neil Oser, also allegedly engaged co-
conspirators in distributing the imported heroin to connections 





However, the district court ordered the New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania sentences to run consecutively to the 10 months 
remaining on Oser’s New York sentence.  
 Oser originally argued in his appellate brief that he 
was not put on adequate notice that committing a crime while on 
pre-sentence release could result in an increased sentence 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3147 and U.S.S.G. § 2J1.7.  He withdrew 
that argument following a showing by the government  that 
before Oser was released on the New York charges, he signed an 
Appearance Bond which stipulated the conditions of his release 
and expressly stated that “DEFENDANT ADVISED BY MAGISTRATE OF 
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF 18 U.S.C. § 3156/3147 IN WRITING.”  
Gov't App. at 1.  That advice appeared on a separate page under 
the heading, “Advice of Penalties and Sanctions” that was also 
signed by Oser and that clearly warned Oser of the enhanced 
penalty he faced for committing a crime while on bond.  Id. at 4. 
 On oral argument, Oser conceded that he did, in fact, receive 
sufficient notice that any offense committed while on bond would 
result in an enhanced sentence, and he no longer challenges the 
one year enhancement imposed by the district court. 
 Instead, Oser's argument now is limited to his 
contention that under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) and § 5G1.3(c) the 
district court here was required to impose the conspiracy 
sentences to be served concurrent to the New York currency 






 We have jurisdiction over the appeal of this sentence 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   Our review of the construction of 
the Sentencing Guidelines is plenary.  United States v. 
Holifield, 53 F.2d 11, 13 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 II.   
 Section 5G1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines is the 
provision designed to guide the district courts in determining 
whether a sentence on a defendant subject to an undischarged term 
of imprisonment is to run consecutively or concurrently.  At the 
time of sentencing, that section, which has since been amended, 
provided:   
§5G1.3Imposition of a Sentence on a Defendant Subject to an 
Undischarged Term of Imprisonment 
 
 (a)If the instant offense was committed while the 
defendant was serving a term of imprisonment 
(including work release, furlough, or escape 
status) or after sentencing for, but before 
commencing service of, such term of imprisonment, 
the sentence for the instant offense shall be 
imposed to run consecutively to the undischarged 
term of imprisonment. 
 
 (b)If subsection (a) does not apply, and the 
undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from 
offense(s) that have been fully taken into account 
in the determination of the offense level for the 
instant offense, the sentence for the instant 
offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to 
the undischarged term of imprisonment. 
 
 (c)(Policy Statement)  In any other case, the sentence 
for the instant offense shall be imposed to run 
consecutively to the prior undischarged term of 
imprisonment to the extent necessary to achieve a 
reasonable incremental punishment for the instant 
offense. 
 





 Both parties agree that § 5G1.3(a) is inapplicable 
here.  The second offense (subject of the Pennsylvania 
indictment) was committed before Oser was sentenced on the first 
offense, the New York money reporting charge.  The dispute 
instead turns first on the applicability of § 5G1.3(b).   
 U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) requires a judge to impose a 
sentence to run concurrently to an undischarged term of 
imprisonment when the conduct that gave rise to the prior 
conviction has “been fully taken into account in the 
determination of the offense level for the instant offense.”  
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) (emphasis added).  Earlier conduct has been 
“fully taken into account” where it has been used as a "§ 1B1.3 
(Relevant Conduct) factor in determining the offense level for 
the instant offense."  U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, comment. (n.2).  Such a 
consideration may occur when the separate offenses are part of 
the “same criminal conduct,” or “part of the same course of 
conduct.”  Id.   
 The district court determined that Oser’s base offense 
level was 34, which it calculated solely because the total 
quantity of heroin involved in the two conspiracies to import 
heroin from Nigeria was more than 3 but lower than 10 kilograms. 
 App. at 61.  It then imposed a three level enhancement pursuant 
to § 2J1.7 because the offense was committed while Oser was on 
pre-sentence release from the New York offense.2  Id.  It is 
                     
2  U.S.S.G. § 2J1.7 provides: 
 
If an enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 3147 applies, 
add 3 levels to the offense level 





important to note that this enhancement applies irrespective of 
any relationship vel non between the New York offense and the 
Pennsylvania or New Jersey conspiracies.  Thus Oser would have 
been subject to this enhancement even if the New York offense for 
which he was released had been a sex crime rather than a currency 
offense.  Nothing in the district court's imposition of sentence 
suggests that the fact that Oser had been discovered 
underreporting the amount of currency he was carrying as he left 
the country was viewed by the district court in Pennsylvania as 
relevant conduct in determining Oser's offense level. 
 The district court acted on the basis of the pre-
sentence report and its rulings on objections thereto by the 
parties.  That report carefully listed all the "related cases," 
and included the charges against Martin Oser (in the Pennsylvania 
(..continued) 
release as if this section were a 
specific offense characteristic 
contained in the offense guideline 
for the offense committed on 
release. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3147 states: 
 
[A] person convicted of an offense committed while 
released under this chapter shall 
be sentenced, in addition to the 
sentence prescribed for the offense 
to -- 
 (1) a term of imprisonment of not more 
than ten years if the offense is a 
felony; or 
 (2) a term of imprisonment of not more 
than one year if the offense is a 
misdemeanor.   
 
A term of imprisonment imposed under this section 
shall be consecutive to any other 





case), and those against Robert Gist and Femi Ojo (in the New 
Jersey case).  Similarly, the "offense conduct" detailed in the 
pre-sentence report covers only the conspiracies in the 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey cases.  The references to the New 
York criminal charge are limited to the fact of its filing and 
the fact that Oser was on release when he committed the offenses 
covered in the New Jersey indictment.  We see no basis to 
conclude that Oser's conduct that was the basis of his New York 
currency crime, i.e. underreporting of the amount of funds being 
carried out of the country, played any part in the determination 
of the offense level for his conspiracy sentence. 
 Oser claims that § 5G1.3(b) applies to him because the 
government named his New York underreporting conviction as an 
overt act in the Pennsylvania conspiracy indictment, thereby 
establishing that the two crimes were “part of the same course of 
conduct.”  While that contention seems plausible on its face, it 
does not withstand close scrutiny. 
 The Commentary to the guideline gives as an 
illustration of the applicability of § 5G1.3(b) the situation 
where a defendant has been convicted in federal court for sale of 
30 grams of cocaine following an earlier state court conviction 
for cocaine sales of 15 grams.  The two offenses are to be 
treated as part of the same course of conduct if that defendant 
would be deemed responsible for the sale of a total of 45 grams 
of cocaine as relevant conduct resulting in an offense level of 
14.  The Commentary states that because the offense level in the 





both charges, under § 5G1.3(b) the court should impose the 
federal sentence to run concurrently with the state sentence.  It 
explains: "Because the defendant has already served six months on 
the related state charge, a sentence of seven months, imposed to 
run concurrently with the remainder of the defendant's state 
sentence, achieves this result."  U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b), comment. 
(n.2). 
 The district court in Oser's case calculated the amount 
of heroin from both the Pennsylvania and New Jersey conspiracies 
in setting the relevant conduct as involving from 3 to 10 
kilograms.  At sentencing the court stated that 
 we will confine ourselves to what was 
agreed as the basis for the plea of 
guilty in New Jersey, which would 
be a quantity between 3 and 10, and 
to which one would add the .446 of 
a kilogram from Philadelphia . . . 
. that is the figure which I will 
use as the drug quantity in 
calculating the offense level.  We 
are proceeding, of course, with 
these charges grouped and that 
explains the linking of the New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania charges. 
Transcript of Sentencing, January 26, 1995 at 17.  Applying the 
illustration from the Commentary, this means the court had fully 
taken into account the New Jersey conduct in setting the offense 
level for the Pennsylvania offense. 
 Oser relies on the fact that the government included as 
an overt act in the Pennsylvania indictment the following 
reference to the New York conduct:   
 On or about June 19, 1991, defendant 
NEIL OSER attempted to smuggle 
approximately $800,000 cash out of 





Kennedy International Airport in 
New York with a final destination 
of Lagos, Nigeria. 
Except for this single sentence, there is no subsequent reference 
or tie-up to Oser's New York conduct occurring in June 1991.  
Instead, the Pennsylvania indictment is confined to two 
transactions involving importation of heroin from Nigeria, which 
began with a telephone conversation between a confidential 
informant and Neil Oser's brother Marty in October 1991 (almost 
four months after the New York arrest) to set up a meeting to 
discuss arrangements for importation of heroin from Nigeria, via 
pick up at the airport in Amsterdam, effected early November 
1991, and arrangements for a second shipment again through 
Amsterdam.  The indictment alleged participation by two 
confidential informants, one or more Drug Enforcement 
Administration agents, and Neil Oser, who in the course of the 
conspiracy cashed $7,200 of postal money orders given to his 
brother as part payment for one of the deliveries.  The last 
overt act alleged was a meeting between Neil Oser, his brother 
and DEA agents on March 31, 1992 to discuss additional 
importation of heroin.  The mere reference to the New York 
conduct as an overt act, nowhere else explained, cannot be used 
to evidence that the underreporting of currency in New York was 
part of the same course of conduct charged in the Pennsylvania 
indictment. 
 Nor is there any suggestion that the underreporting was 
part of the conduct alleged in New Jersey, which alleged a 





multikilograms of heroin from Nigeria from about July 1992 until 
February 1993 and which, as further detailed in the pre-sentence 
report, involved smuggling heroin into the United States through 
the lining of suit jackets, via a sophisticated network of 
couriers. 
 The charge filed in New York is independent of that in 
either indictment.  The New York waiver of indictment merely 
provided that Neil Oser "is accused of knowingly and willfully 
failing to file a report as defined in Title 31, United States 
Code, Section 5316(b) when knowingly transporting and being about 
to transport monetary instruments of more than $10,000 at one 
time, to wit, approximately $790,000 in United States currency, 
from a place in the United States to a place outside the United 
States."   
 Although Oser's counsel argued before us that the New 
York conduct is part of the same course of conduct as alleged in 
the other indictments, there is nothing in the New York charges 
that refers to drugs or any drug conspiracy.  Oser offers nothing 
on the record to show a connection.  Indeed, if Oser had not 
already pled guilty to underreporting the currency carried in New 
York, the government would have been free to prosecute him for it 
after it secured a conviction on the Pennsylvania drug 
conspiracy, regardless of its inclusion as an overt act.  See 
Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 787 (1985) (separate 
offenses may be prosecuted separately without offending double 
jeopardy, even if one is a predicate act for another); United 





denied, 500 U.S. 915 (1991).  Therefore, mere inclusion of a 
prior offense as an overt act in a conspiracy is not sufficient 
to constitute relevant conduct under § 1B1.1, and it was not 
taken into account by the district court in setting Oser's 
offense level.    
 Oser chose to pursue two courses of criminal conduct 
separately recognized by Congress: failure to file a truthful 
currency report in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5316 and 
conspiracies to import heroin into the United States in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. § 963.  A concurrent sentence is not compelled by § 
5G1.3(b) in this situation.  
 In light of the dissent's criticism of the government's 
actions, we note that the government could not have filed all the 
charges together in one proceeding.  By the time the government 
had a basis to indict Oser for the conspiracy to import heroin 
that was the subject of the Pennsylvania indictment, which was 
returned on July 29, 1992, Oser had already waived indictment and 
entered into a guilty plea on his June 19, 1991 conduct leading 
to the currency charge in New York.  On that charge, he waived 
indictment, pled guilty and entered into a plea agreement on 
November 26, 1991.  There is nothing in the record to compare 
this case with United States v. McCormick, 58 F.3d 874, 878 (2d 
Cir. 1995), where it appeared that the government deliberately 
seized upon a "perverse incentive" to try related crimes in 
separate jurisdictions. 
 Furthermore, the consolidation of the Pennsylvania 





suggestion that the underlying charges in all three cases were 
part of the same course of conduct.  The consolidation was 
directed for disposition only after Oser pled guilty in 
Pennsylvania.  The government has consistently argued that the 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania conspiracies were separate.  
Nonetheless, once Oser also pled guilty in the New Jersey case, 
the district court did give Oser the benefit of concurrent 
sentences for the Pennsylvania and New Jersey crimes.  
 Inasmuch as we conclude that subsection (b) does not 
apply to Oser's case, it follows that subsection (c) is the 
relevant guideline provision for determining whether his sentence 
should be imposed concurrently or consecutively to the remainder 
of his 28 month New York sentence.  Under subsection (c), 
characterized as a "policy statement," the sentence for the 
offenses at issue, here the Pennsylvania and New Jersey 
conspiracies to import heroin, was to be imposed to run 
consecutively "to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to 
the extent necessary to achieve a reasonable incremental 
punishment for the instant offense."  U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) (1994). 
 Application Note 3 sets out a methodology "to assist the court 
in determining the appropriate sentence."  U.S.S.G. § 3G1.3, 
comment. (n.3).  At the time of Oser's sentencing that Note 
provided, in part,  
To the extent practicable, the court should consider a 
reasonable incremental penalty to be a 
sentence for the instant offense that results 
in a combined sentence of imprisonment that 
approximates the total punishment that would 
have been imposed under § 5G1.2 (Sentencing 
on Multiple Counts of Conviction) had all of 





sentences were being imposed at the same 
time.  Id. 3 
 
 According to Oser, the district judge did not apply the 
appropriate methodology in sentencing him consecutively, and 
failed to state any reasons for avoiding the methodology as is 
required by United States v. Holifield, 53 F.3d 11, 17 (3d Cir. 
1995).  We disagree. 
 The methodology outlined by the Application Note merely 
suggests that a judge first approximate the “total sentence” for 
a defendant as if the defendant were being sentenced for all his 
offenses at the same time; this “total sentence” then provides 
the judge with the maximum and minimum range for sentencing the 
defendant on the instant offense.  See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, comment. 
(n.3); United States v. Spiers, 82 F.3d 1274, 1278 (3d Cir. 
1996).  As long as a consecutively imposed sentence falls within 
this maximum and minimum range, a judge has imposed a “reasonable 
incremental punishment” as described by the § 5G1.3(c).  U.S.S.G. 
§ 561.3, comment. (n.3).  Beyond that limitation, the court 
                     
3    U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) was amended effective November 1, 1995, 
and now provides the district court with even more discretion to 
fashion a sentence for a defendant subject to an undischarged 
term of imprisonment.  It states: 
 
(Policy Statement) In any other case, the sentence for 
the instant offense may be imposed to run 
concurrently, partially, concurrently, or 
consecutively to the prior undischarged term 
of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable 
punishment for the instant offense.   
 
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) (1995).  The application note to this section 
was changed to correspond to the amendment.  See U.S.S.G. § 





retains broad discretion to choose the length and sequence of 
punishment.   
 The Commentary continues: “Generally, the court may 
achieve an appropriate sentence through its determination of an 
appropriate point within the applicable guideline range for the 
instant federal offense, combined with its determination of 
whether that sentence will run concurrently or consecutively to 
the undischarged term of imprisonment.”  Id.   
 The district court manifestly considered the guideline 
methodology in sentencing Oser for his part in the heroin 
importation conspiracies.  The court determined on the record 
that a base offense level of 34 based on the quantity of heroin, 
with Oser's criminal history category II,  produced an applicable 
guideline range of 168-210 months for the New Jersey offense, 
which the court deemed to be the appropriate total sentence for 
both the conspiracy offenses.  The district judge stated that he 
was departing from the guideline range in Oser’s case because of 
the government’s submission of a § 5K1.1 letter.  Transcript of 
Sentencing, January 26, 1995 at 62.  The district court 
ultimately sentenced Oser to 9 years imprisonment to run 
consecutively to the ten month undischarged term of imprisonment 
remaining for his New York offense, for a total of 118 months, a 
term well below the guideline range.  The court then imposed an 
additional one year term of imprisonment pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 
2J1.7, making Oser’s total sentence 130 months. 
 Though the district court did not expressly announce to 





methodology, the guidelines nowhere require such formality.  We 
have said that a court is free to abandon the penalty prescribed 
by the guideline's methodology as long as the court “indicates 
its reasons for imposing the penalty in such a way as to allow us 
to see that it has considered the methodology.”  Spiers, 82 F.3d 
at 1275. 
 The court clearly explained why it was not imposing the 
conspiracy sentences to run concurrently with the 10 months 
remaining on the New York sentence.  It first stated: 
 I do not think we are in the double 
jeopardy area as a constitutional 
matter, nor do I think I have 
authority to conclude, while it's 
just not good policy and, 
therefore, I won't do it, I think 
that Congress has been directive.  
It says there shall be an 
enhancement when you commit a crime 
when you're on release and I don't 
think I can avoid the impact of 
that unless I'm to conclude that 
the statute as applied here would 
be unconstitutional; it would be 
imposing a double punishment.  And 
I don't think it is. 
 
Transcript of Sentencing, January 26, 1995 at 20.  
 Later, in sentencing, the district court stated as 
follows: 
I have concluded . . . in constructing the sentence that I 
will not follow the recommendation of the 
defense that I make this sentence concurrent 
with the sentence which Mr. Oser is now 
serving in New York.  
 . . . I think it would not be harmonious 
with the proposition that an 
enhancement is to be made of the 
sentence to be imposed today for 
the reason that Mr. Oser went out 
while on release from the New York 
charges and engaged in independent 





 . . . to then make today’s sentence 
concurrent with the New York 
sentence. [It] would not be 
harmonious with that enhancement. 
 
Id. at 62-63.  The district court's explanation that a concurrent 
sentence would run against the policy of Congress and the 
Sentencing Guidelines in requiring that the sentence be enhanced 
if the crime was committed while on release elsewhere was a 
satisfactory basis for the use of a methodology different from 
that suggested by the Application Note.  We therefore reject 
Oser's claim of error in sentencing him to a term of imprisonment 
consecutive to that which he was serving in the New York charge. 
 III. 
 Oser's final claim is that the district court erred in 
placing him in Criminal History Category II.  Under U.S.S.G. § 
4A1.1, the district court is to "[a]dd 3 points for each prior 
sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month" 
(emphasis added).  Oser contends that the error was counting his 
New York conviction as a “prior sentence.”  Repeating his earlier 
analysis, Oser argues that criminal history points should not 
have been assigned for the New York crime since that offense 
should be regarded as “part of the instant offense” under 
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1), and part of a “common scheme or plan” 
under United States v. Hallman, 23 F.3d 821, 825 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 115 S.Ct. 216 (1994).   
 Oser did not raise this objection at his sentencing 
hearing, and agreed to a Criminal History Category II at that 





error.  See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 
725, 735-37, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1778-78 (1993) (“plain error” must 
be particularly egregious and seriously affect the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings). 
 Under Application Note 1 to § 4A1.2(a), “prior 
sentence” means a sentence “imposed prior to sentencing on the 
instant offense, other than a sentence for conduct that is part 
of the instant offense.”  “Conduct that is part of the instant 
offense,” in turn means, “conduct that is relevant conduct to the 
instant offense under the provisions of § 1B1.3 (Relevant 
Conduct).”   U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2), comment. (n.1) (1994).  As 
explained above, Oser’s currency underreporting offense played no 
part in the determination of his base offense level for the 
sentence on the heroin conspiracies offense; thus, the conduct 
for which he was previously sentenced was not the type of 
“Relevant Conduct” that would preclude a separate computation of 
criminal history points under § 4A1.2(a)(2).   
 Contrary to Oser’s suggestion, our decision in Hallman, 
23 F.3d at 825, does not require a contrary holding.  In Hallman, 
where the defendant was indicted in federal court for the offense 
of stealing mail in the form of blank checks, we concluded that 
the conduct underlying the defendant's state conviction for 
forgery was part of the same scheme and conduct as the federal 
offense and therefore could not count as a "prior sentence" under 
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1).  See id. at 826.  In that case, the two 
crimes were necessarily related; one would not attempt to steal 





 Here, there is nothing to show a relationship between 
the offense of underreporting the currency carried and the drug 
conspiracy offenses.  Indeed, the New Jersey indictment to which 
Oser pled guilty alleged an agreement and acts that began after 
Oser’s arrest for underreporting the currency charges.  
Therefore, the district judge did not plainly err in assessing 
Oser criminal history points for his New York offense pursuant to 
§ 4A1.1(a). 
 IV. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
district court's judgment of conviction and sentence. 
 























































ROSENN, J., dissenting. 
 I believe that the appellant's indictment and 
conviction in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York on the charge of failing to report the 
transportation of cash abroad was part and parcel of the larger 
conspiracy for which he was indicted and sentenced in the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania (for importing heroin into the United 
States and money laundering), as well as the conspiracy for which 
he was indicted in the District of New Jersey.  Thus, the 
sentences for the Pennsylvania and New Jersey offenses should 
have been imposed under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) concurrently to the 
undischarged term of imprisonment that he was then serving under 








 The two conspiracies in Pennsylvania and New Jersey 
involved the alleged importation of heroin from Nigeria.  (Maj. 
op. at 6)  The arrest in New York at the JFK Airport on June 19, 
1991 was for failure to report $790,000 in cash that he was 
carrying as he was about to board a flight for Lagos, Nigeria.  
Oser pled guilty to the charges in New York on November 26, 1991, 
and the court released him on bail pending the sentence which it 
imposed on July 16, 1993.  The district court imposed sentence on 
Oser for the Pennsylvania and New Jersey offenses while he was 
serving time for the New York offense for failure to report the 
currency he was carrying.  At the time of the Pennsylvania 
sentences, Oser had served 18 months of his 28 month New York 
sentence.  The district court determined that his ten-year 
sentence on the Pennsylvania and New Jersey offenses should run 
consecutively to this sentence.  Thus, Oser's time on this 
sentence would not even begin to run until he had served ten more 
months in prison.  Oser argues now, as he did at sentencing, that 
this determination fails to consider the applicable U.S.S.G. 
guideline provision, § 5G1.3(b). 
 This Guideline provision assists the courts in 
sentencing a defendant who is subject to an undischarged term of 
imprisonment.  There are three subparts which limit the court's 
discretion.  Part (a) is applicable only when the instant offense 
was committed either while the defendant was serving a sentence, 
or after sentencing but before imprisonment, and mandates a 
consecutive sentence.  The parties agree that this subpart is 





time of his guilty plea and his sentencing.  Part (b) applies 
only if the undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from 
offenses that were fully taken into account in the determination 
of the offense level for the present offense, and mandates that 
the prison terms run concurrently.  It provides that if 
subsection (a) does not apply and "the undischarged term of 
imprisonment resulting from offenses that have been fully taken 
into account in the determination of the offense level for the 
instant offenses the sentence for the instant offenses shall be 
imposed to run concurrently to the undischarged term of 
imprisonment."  Part (c), called the policy statement, applies in 
all other cases, and permits the court to impose a consecutive, 
partially consecutive, or concurrent sentence as desired in order 
to achieve a reasonable incremental punishment for the instant 
offense. 
 I believe that the record establishes that Oser's New 
York conduct was taken into account.  Under a reading of 
Application note 2 to § 5G1.3, subsection (b) could include 
federal charges in other jurisdictions for the same criminal 
conduct, or for different criminal charges that were part of the 
same course of conduct.  Here, the charges  in all three states 
stem from one ongoing course of criminal conduct concerning a 
large-scale conspiracy to import heroin. 
 The Government argues that the Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey indictments, although they involve a continuation of 
Oser's drug smuggling activities, cover different time periods 





they are different courses of conduct.  This, it seems, is 
contradicted by their consolidation and by the concurrent 
sentences imposed for the Pennsylvania and New Jersey charges. 
 More importantly, the conduct for which Oser was 
sentenced in New York, failure to file a currency report, is 
cited as an overt act of the conspiracy charged in Pennsylvania. 
 The Government has thus acknowledged that the act is part of the 
same course of conduct.  Because it has used this act to charge 
Oser with conspiracy, it is estopped from arguing on appeal that 
the act is wholly irrelevant to the conspiracies charges to which 
he pled guilty.  The Government has, in effect, recognized that 
the New York offense is part of the same course of conduct as the 
present crime, by including it as an overt act of the conspiracy 
described in the present indictment.  This is supported by the 
response of Seth Weber, Assistant United States Attorney, who at 
sentencing of Oser in New York City made this statement: 
"And when you talk about these criminal charges 
being an aberration for Mr. Oser we 
may be missing the boat here 
because we're dealing with criminal 
conduct that spanned two years, 
from 1991 through 1993, that we 
know of.  1991 when he attempted to 
take $800,000 in cash out of the 
country without reporting it 
knowing that it was a result of 
drug proceeds.  That's what started 
this ball rolling for Mr. Oser." 
 
Therefore, subsection (b) of § 5G1.3 applies. 
 The point I make is not only of importance to Oser but 
to the federal criminal justice system generally.  It is not 





attempt to charge several discrete conspiracies, with indictments 
in different jurisdictions, and thereby obtain multiple 
sentences.  In United States v. McCormick, 58 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 
1995), the defendant was sentenced in two district courts in the 
Second Circuit for separate frauds against two separate banks, 
each part of an ongoing fraud conspiracy.  The court considering 
the second indictment dismissed 31 of the 41 counts, in 
recognition of possible double jeopardy issues, but permitted 
prosecution of the other ten counts.  It then sentenced the 
defendant to serve his sentence consecutive to the preceding 
sentence.4  Although the Second Circuit affirmed this decision, 
it noted: 
[T]his result unfairly punishes McCormick for 
events to a real extent outside his 
control, namely, his prosecution in 
two separate fora for a single 
pattern of fraudulent activity.  It 
is acknowledged by the Government 
that if McCormick had been subject 
to a single prosecution for his 
crimes, he would have received, at 
most, a single 46-month term of 
imprisonment.  That he is now 
subject to an additional, 
consecutive 35-month term creates a 
perverse incentive for prosecutors. 
 In order to maximize the sentences 
received by defendants, prosecutors 
can, where possible, try defendants 
in multiple jurisdictions for 
different but related crimes.  As 
mentioned above, we are bound by 
the Guidelines and the law of this 
circuit to reach the result in this 
case.  In our view, however, this 
problem deserves a renewed, close 
                     
4The district court in that case specifically noted the existence 






examination by the Sentencing 
Commission. 
 
McCormick, at 878. 
The effect of the prosecutions in the three jurisdictions in the 
instant case is to maximize Oser's sentence for what is, in 
effect, the same course of conduct.  This is impermissible under 
the Guidelines, and unreasonable. 
 Prosecutors have a great deal of discretion in the way 
they choose to frame charges against a defendant.  In this case, 
rather than limit themselves to Oser's substantive offenses, the 
prosecutors set out to charge him with conspiracy, and cited his 
substantive offenses as overt acts in furtherance of that 
conspiracy.  This is well within prosecutorial discretion.  
However, having chosen to frame their charges in such a fashion, 
they are also bound by its limitations.  Oser's failure to file a 
currency report is either a substantive offense in New York, or 
an overt act in furtherance of the Pennsylvania conspiracy.  
However, it borders on double jeopardy to permit prosecutors to 
have it both ways, and for the court to sentence Oser twice for 
conduct essentially part of the conspiracy for which he is being 
separately sentenced.  The gravamen of Oser's concern is not that 
he was indicted in three jurisdictions, but having been indicted 
in New York for conduct that was in furtherance of the overall 
conspiracy, the ultimate sentence imposed in Pennsylvania should 
have been concurrent to the sentence remaining to be served under 





 Therefore, when a defendant is convicted of conspiracy 
in one jurisdiction and the evidence includes criminal conduct 
for which he has been previously prosecuted and convicted in 
another federal jurisdiction, or he has been previously 
prosecuted and convicted for different criminal charges that were 
part of the same conspiratorial course of conduct, the sentence 
imposed in the later conviction must be concurrent with the first 
sentence. 
 The district court in Pennsylvania, therefore, should 
have applied U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) in sentencing Oser and have the 
sentence it imposed run concurrently with the portion of the New 
York sentence which had not yet been served. 
 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
